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This-the  eighth-edition  of the NBER Macroeconomics  Annual contains 
six papers,  with  a mix reflecting  the Annual's twin  goals-first  of pre- 
senting,  extending,  and applying  frontier work in macroeconomics,  and 
second,  of  encouraging  and  stimulating  work  by  macroeconomists  on 
current policy  issues. 
Among  the papers that present  and extend  frontier research are those 
by Ricardo Caballero and Adam Jaffe, who  develop  a growth  model  in 
which  research  and  innovation  are  the  driving  forces  of  growth;  by 
Gilles  Saint-Paul,  who  develops  a political  economy  model  that seeks 
to explain why  European governments  can be reelected  even  when  un- 
employment  in  their  countries  rises  to  double-digit  levels;  by  Anton 
Braun and  Ellen  McGrattan,  who  use  a real business  cycle  model  to 
explain  the  behavior  of  real  output,  consumption,  and  wages  in  the 
United  States and United  Kingdom  during  the two world wars; and by 
Robert Pindyck and Andres  Solimano,  who  develop  and seek empirical 
confirmation  of a well-known  model  pioneered  by Pindyck  and others 
in which  uncertainty  delays  investment. 
Two  of the  papers  directly address  current policy  issues.  Alan Gelb, 
Gary Jefferson,  and Inderjit Singh  examine  the extraordinary economic 
growth  achieved  in China during the last 15 years. The Chinese  success 
story is often  held  out as an example  of how  a formerly socialist  econ- 
omy should reform itself,  and the authors examine  the contrast between 
it and  East European  countries.  Finally,  the  paper  by John Boyd  and 
Mark Gertler describes  the dimensions  and causes  of the ongoing  bank- 
ing crisis in the United  States. 
We believe  that these  papers offer a good  sample of the current issues 
and exciting  research directions  in macroeconomics.  We limit ourselves 
in  this  introduction  to  brief  descriptions  of  the  papers;  an  important 2  .  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
contribution  of the  conference,  however,  is in the formal and  informal 
comments  that follow  each  paper. 
Growth comes  in large part from productivity  growth.  And productiv- 
ity growth  comes,  in turn,  largely  from R&D. The nature  of R&D and 
its contribution  to growth  are the subject of the paper by Ricardo Cabal- 
lero and Adam  Jaffe. 
There are two  aspects  to the  dynamics  of R&D. One  has  to do  with 
ideas.  New  ideas build on previous  ones  and in the process  make them 
partly obsolete.  The other has to do with new  products.  New  inventions 
lead to new  products  and in the process  make old products  less  attrac- 
tive.  Recent models  of growth  and R&D have captured  these  twin pro- 
cesses,  but  empirical  work  has  yet  to  quantify  them.  This  is  the  task 
taken up by the authors. 
They start by constructing  a model built on both processes.  Inventions 
are a function  of research time and of the stock of existing  knowledge. 
Old ideas  lose  usefulness  in proportion  not  to time but to the number 
of new  ideas  that have  since  been  developed.  In the  product  market, 
inventions  lead to better products.  Those  new  products  in turn steadily 
displace  older  and,  thus,  less  attractive  products.  The  two  processes 
obviously  interact.  Higher  values  for  patents  lead  to  a  faster  rate of 
invention  and  in  turn  to  faster  product  cycles.  Faster product  cycles 
lead  to  a smaller  present  value  of  monopoly  rents,  smaller  values  for 
patents-thus,  a  smaller  rate  of  inventions.  In the  rest  of  the  paper, 
Caballero and Jaffe estimate  the crucial parameters of both parts of their 
model. 
Using  a random  sample  of patents  granted in the United  States from 
1975 to 1992, which  includes  not only  the patents  but also the old pat- 
ents  cited  by  the  new  patents,  they  construct  and  estimate  a "citation 
function."  The citation function  is a way  of thinking about and estimat- 
ing  how  useful  existing  patents  are in the  production  of  new  patents 
and  how  patents  become  obsolete  as new  patents  are developed.  One 
tantalizing  finding,  for  it  offers  a  potential  clue  to  the  slowdown  of 
productivity  growth,  is that recent patents  appear to have smaller spill- 
overs  for  other  patents  than  was  the  case  before,  thus  leading  to  a 
smaller rate of productivity  growth  for a given  level  of research. 
To estimate  the  rate at which  new  products  displace  old  ones,  the 
speed  of  "creative  destruction,"  the  authors  use  the  NBER R&D data 
set,  which  includes  both  Compustat  information  and U.S.  patent  data. 
From this they  conclude  that the rate of creative destruction  was  in the 
range  of 2-7%  a year in the  1970s, with  the  rate being  as high  as 25% 
in some  sectors. 
Having  obtained  estimates,  they  finally  return  to  their  model,  and Editorial  3 
show  the  quantitative  implications  of their findings;  these  results  pro- 
vide  only  a hint of what  this line of work can yield.  We think that their 
paper  is  an important  contribution.  Not  only  does  it provide  a frame- 
work to integrate the available evidence  on the R&D process in a macro- 
economic  context,  but it already  makes  much  progress  in this  process 
of integration. 
China's  economic  performance  since  it started reforming in 1978 has 
been  spectacular.  Per capita  income  has  risen  more  than  6% per year 
over that period,  which  means  that average income  has more than dou- 
bled  since  1978. Alan  Gelb,  Gary Jefferson,  and Inderjit Singh describe 
the policies  and responses  that underlie  that growth,  and they ask what 
else  China needs  to do to maintain  its growth  momentum. 
While Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh  are moderately  sceptical about Chi- 
nese  data,  they  do  not  doubt  that  growth  has  been  extremely  rapid, 
and  that per capita real income  on  a purchasing  power  basis  is closer 
to $2000 than the $370 (based  on an exchange  rate conversion  method) 
recorded  in  World  Bank  publications.  This  would  make  the  Chinese 
economy  either the second  or third largest in the world.  They warn that 
the  potential  understatement  of  GDP may  not  apply  equally  to  all its 
components,  and  they  suggest  that  the  recorded  Chinese  investment 
ratios of nearly 40% may be overstated-but  that if they  are, then  Chi- 
nese  productivity  performance  has been  even  better than the 3 + % per 
annum  increase  in  total  factor  productivity  that  Gelb,  Jefferson,  and 
Singh  calculate for the  1980s. They also lay some  stress  on the remark- 
able demographic  transition in China, which  gives  it one of the world's 
lowest  dependency  ratios. 
The Chinese  reform program began in the rural areas with the break- 
ing  up  of the  communes.  By allowing  farmers to work  for themselves 
on leased  land,  and by freeing  up agricultural prices at the margin,  the 
Chinese  government  produced  a rapid supply  response  to the agricul- 
tural reform.  The  improvements  in  agriculture  were  the  backbone  of 
the  original  reform  program,  providing  an anchor  that helped  ensure 
stability as the reforms  spread  to the rest of the economy. 
Although  no  precise  reform strategy for China had been  worked  out 
before  the  rural reforms  went  into  effect,  Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh 
suggest  that the  reform program  can be  divided  into  four phases  and 
seven  areas  of  change.  By now,  elements  of  reform have  affected  all 
sectors  of  the  economy.  Still,  there  remain  major difficulties  that will 
have  to be dealt with  if the pace of Chinese  reform and growth  is to be 
maintained. 
First,  property  rights  in  most  Chinese  firms,  and  for land,  remain 
ambiguous.  State-owned  enterprises  have  not  been  reformed  or sold, 4 ? BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
and  many  lose  money.  Interesting  firm-level  evidence  presented  by 
Gelb, Jefferson,  and  Singh  suggests  that productivity  performance  has 
been  better  the  more  exposed  firms have  been  to market forces.  Still, 
one  of the surprises  of their paper is that productivity  rose quite fast in 
state-owned  as well  as town  and village  enterprises.  Second,  the credit 
mechanism  has not been  sufficiently  reformed,  and there is once again 
the  possibility  of a major credit expansion  and inflation,  the  sequence 
of  events  that led  to  the  repression  and  stabilization  of  1989. Indeed, 
both  discussants  emphasized  the potential  for macroeconomic  instabil- 
ity in the Chinese  economy. 
Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh  end  their paper by discussing  the lessons 
of the Chinese  reforms, which  most readers will take to apply to Eastern 
Europe. They argue that partial, bottom-up,  reforms, can be successful, 
and that a big bang is not necessary  unless  required by macroeconomic 
imbalances.  They  also  argue  that the  Chinese  reforms  will  have  to be 
deepened  for growth  to continue  at the present  rates: The discussants 
concurred  with  this view.  In the floor discussion,  the issue  was  raised 
of why  China had grown  so fast when  conditions  thought  to be neces- 
sary for growth,  such as clear property rights,  were absent.  The discus- 
sion  wrestled  with  the  issue  but  did  not  settle  it.  Nonetheless,  Gelb, 
Jefferson,  and  Singh  certainly  substantially  advance  our knowledge  of 
the Chinese  reform process. 
Unemployment  has  been  high  in  Europe  for  more  than  a  decade. 
Many  economists  have  suggested  more active  policies,  either from the 
demand  side,  or the supply  side.  But little has been  done.  Is it because 
governments  feel  that  nothing  can  be  done,  or because  there  is  little 
political  concern  about  unemployment?  This  is  the  general  question 
taken up by Gilles Saint-Paul. The specific question  he asks is the follow- 
ing:  Suppose  that  high  firing  costs  are  indeed  one  of  the  causes  of 
high  unemployment.  Will a government  that  cares  about  its  electoral 
popularity  try to reduce  those  costs,  and,  if so,  how  should  it do it? 
Saint-Paul first sets  up a simple  model  in which  firing costs  decrease 
the rate of separation.  But because workers are costly to fire, the shadow 
cost of workers  to firms is higher,  so that firing costs  also decrease  the 
hiring rate. Thus,  a reduction  in firing costs  increases  both separations 
and  hirings.  Now  consider  a government  that wants  to  reduce  firing 
costs.  As  this  increases  hiring,  the  unemployed  will  support  such  a 
move.  But, as it increases  firing,  the employed  will typically oppose  it. 
If, as is obviously  the case,  the employed  are more numerous  than the 
unemployed,  the reform will  lack political support. 
Can  the  government  nevertheless  do  something?  Saint-Paul  shows 
that progressive  reform may work.  A two-tier  system  in which  the em- Editorial 5 
ployed  remain protected by high firing costs,  and the unemployed  work 
under lower firing costs,  will typically have the support  of both groups. 
Those  currently  employed  will  be protected  in their job by high  firing 
costs,  and they  know  that, if they were  to become  unemployed,  higher 
hiring would  make it easier to get a job. And  the unemployed  will also 
see improved  hiring prospects.  As time passes,  more and more workers 
will  be  subject  to  low  firing  costs.  At  some  point,  those  workers  will 
have  the majority and will want  to implement  lower  firing costs  for all. 
Then,  the full reform will  pass. 
That this is not the end  of the argument  will be clear to readers con- 
versant  with  issues  of  time  consistency.  As  employed  workers  at the 
beginning  of the process  realize  that they  will eventually  be in the mi- 
nority  and  the  full reform will be  passed,  they  may  oppose  the  initial 
steps.  Saint-Paul  shows  that this will  limit the  size  of the reduction  in 
firing  costs  that  the  government  can  achieve.  If the  reduction  is  too 
large, employed  workers will oppose  it from the start. Saint-Paul finally 
shows  that the  government  has  one  more  tool  in its arsenal.  By intro- 
ducing  conversion  clauses,  e.g.,  a positive  probability that workers with 
low  firing costs  can become  high  firing cost workers,  it will slow  down 
reform, but in doing  so, will make it more palatable to employed  work- 
ers and will,  thus,  get their approval. 
The analysis  of the  paper  makes  us  aware  that there  are better and 
worse  ways  of implementing  reform.  Some  build  constituencies,  some 
do  not.  The  results  in  the  paper  are far from  obvious,  but  once  pre- 
sented,  they  strike  one  as  very  relevant.  Indeed,  in  the  last  section, 
Saint-Paul  shows  how  the  analysis  can  shed  light  on  the  process  of 
labor market  reform  in  Spain.  Reform  design  is  clearly  an  issue  that 
economists,  in their role as advisers,  should  pay more attention  to. 
When  thinking  about  war  time  economies,  most  economists  are 
quickly  led  to  think  of rationing,  forced  saving,  patriotism,  and  other 
nonmarket  mechanisms.  How  else can one explain how  higher military 
spending  displaces  private  consumption  and  investment  spending 
while  real interest  rates typically  become  negative?  How  else  can one 
explain  higher  labor  force  participation  and  higher  average  hours  at 
roughly  the  same  real wages?  How  else  can  one  explain  how  higher 
capacity utilization  and higher employment  are typically associated  with 
higher  measured  productivity? 
In  their  paper,  R.  Anton  Braun  and  Ellen  McGrattan  take  on  the 
challenge.  They  examine  the behavior  of the U.S.  and the U.K.  econo- 
mies  during World War I and World War II. The basic characteristics of 
those  economies,  they  argue,  are  largely  consistent  with  those  that 
emerge  from a competitive  market clearing model.  Their goal is not to 6 ?  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
argue  that  rationing,  price  and  wage  controls,  and  so  on,  were  not 
present;  they  clearly were.  It is to argue  that these  are not essential  to 
an understanding  of what happened.  Their paper is important,  not only 
for  the  specific  issue  it  takes  on,  but  as  a  contribution  to  the  larger 
debate  about  the nature of economic  fluctuations  in general. 
Their paper  starts with  a careful review  of facts for the United  King- 
dom and the United  States during the two world wars. For once,  actual 
facts turn out to accord quite well  with  traditional perceptions.  Output 
increases,  while  consumption  and private investment  usually  decrease. 
Civilian  employment  tends  to increase,  except  when  the  level  of con- 
scription  becomes  very  high.  Labor productivity  goes  up.  And  real 
wages  do not  show  a regular pattern. 
From the point  of view  of models  of perfect competition,  those  facts 
present  two  challenges.  The  first has  to do  with  the joint behavior  of 
quantities.  In the  absence  of  shifts  in technology,  wartime  economies 
should  be moving  along a given  labor demand.  Thus, labor productivity 
and employment  should  move  in opposite  directions.  But, in fact, wars 
appear to be often associated  with  higher employment  and higher labor 
productivity.  The second  has to do with the joint behavior of prices and 
quantities.  For the  same  reason  as labor productivity  should  decrease 
with  employment,  real wages  should  also decrease;  they  often  do not. 
Also,  the  large  increase  in  public  spending  should  lead  to  a large in- 
crease in real interest  rates; typically  interest  rates decrease  instead. 
Braun and McGrattan do not take up the second  challenge,  the joint 
behavior of prices and quantities.  Implicitly, they assume,  various forms 
of controls  and rationing  may lead to deviations  between  observed  and 
shadow  prices.  Looking at observed  prices would  then not be very use- 
ful.  But they  focus  on  the  first, the behavior  of labor productivity  and 
employment.  They  suggest  that the  puzzle  has  a simple  solution,  the 
accumulation  of  government-financed  capital,  not  counted  as  private 
investment,  but used  by the private  sector.  They show  that, in all four 
episodes,  a large part of public spending  was  indeed  on capital used  by 
private  firms.  And  they  argue,  the  steady  accumulation  of this  capital 
is what  shifts the labor demand  curve over time, explaining  the positive 
co-movements  in employment  and labor productivity. 
They  proceed  to calibrate a real business  cycle  model  in which  they 
allow  for two  deviations  from  standard  assumptions,  the  existence  of 
conscription  and  the  existence  of  government  provided  capital.  Their 
goal is to see  whether  they  can replicate not only  the sign but also the 
magnitude  of the co-movement  in labor productivity  and employment. 
They come  close. Editorial  7 
Thus, they conclude,  the allocation of resources in wartime economies 
is quite consistent  with  what  one would  expect from real business  cycle 
theory.  Their paper  is not  only  instructive  but also  a good  example  of 
the methodology  underlying  real business  cycle research. 
There  has  been  a great deal  of work  recently  on  the  implications  of 
the irreversibility of investment-the  fact that once an investment  proj- 
ect has been  undertaken,  it is very costly  to undo.  The popular version 
of  the  outcome  of  that  work  is  that  in  the  presence  of  irreversibility, 
investment  can be very  sensitive  to uncertainty  about returns.  The in- 
vestor  contemplating  a  project  always  has  the  option  of  waiting  for 
better  conditions;  the  moment  he  or she  commits  to  the  project,  the 
option  of waiting  is lost.  Calculations  reported  by Robert Pindyck  and 
Andres  Solimano  in Figure 1 of their paper  show  both  that the hurdle 
rate for investing  is both very sensitive  to uncertainty,  and that reason- 
able levels  of uncertainty  can easily  double  or triple the hurdle  rate. 
This work,  applying  option  theory  to physical  investment,  has been 
widely  although  informally  cited to argue that low levels  of investment 
following  stabilizations  are accounted  for by the uncertainty  about the 
success  of the reforms.  One  of the contributions  made by Pindyck and 
Solimano  is  to  point  out  that  great  care has  to be  taken  in  using  the 
option  theory approach,  because  it does  not necessarily  show  that aver- 
age  investment  over  long  periods  would  be  lower  in  countries  with 
more instability  than in more  stable countries. 
They first outline  the partial equilibrium theory on which the informal 
arguments  linking  low  investment  to  uncertainty  and  instability  are 
based,  and  then  go  on to present  a more fully worked-out  equilibrium 
model  in which  asset  prices  and  interest  rates can adjust when  uncer- 
tainty  rises.  In  these  models,  greater  uncertainty  may  lead  to  lower 
interest  rates rather than lower  investment. 
Having  shown  the ambiguity  of the relationship  between  uncertainty 
and investment,  Pindyck  and Solimano  go on to examine  the empirical 
relationship.  The key  relationship  is that between  the  marginal profit- 
ability of capital and the hurdle  rate for investment.  They calculate the 
former, for 29 countries,  using  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions,  and 
they approximate  the latter using  extreme values  of marginal productiv- 
ity.  Their estimate  of uncertainty  is the standard deviation  of marginal 
profitability. 
They also relate the variability of marginal profitability to various indi- 
cators  of  macroeconomic  instability  and  find  the  tightest  relationship 
between  the inflation  rate and uncertainty  about profitability. This rela- 
tionship  is  strongest  for  the  developing  countries  in  the  group.  The 8  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
surprise is that the rate of inflation is more closely  related to the variabil- 
ity of marginal profitability than the standard deviation  of inflation and 
other measures  of macroeconomic  instability. 
The evidence  is mildly  supportive  of the view  that there is a negative 
relationship  between  uncertainty  and  inflation,  but  Pindyck  and  Soli- 
mano  clearly  regard  their  results  as  cause  for further  research  rather 
than  definitive.  In  particular,  in  the  discussion  they  focused  on  the 
possibility  that more  information  about the power  of the theory  might 
be  available  using  firm-level  data; they  also  are considering  extending 
the sample  of countries.  The bottom  line is thus that the theory  is very 
interesting  and  suggestive,  but that a careful look at the data does  not 
yet  provide  strong  support  for its  empirical  significance.  That means 
the Pindyck-Solimano  paper is sure to stimulate  further research. 
After the savings  and loans crisis, many expected  that the commercial 
banking  system  would  suffer a similar though  smaller scale crisis. With 
the assistance  of the unusually  steep term structure of the last few years, 
that crisis did not happen,  even  though  the number of bank failures in 
the second  half of the 1980s was  well  above earlier levels.  Nonetheless, 
there  has  been  great concern  about  the  health  of the banking  system, 
and  its  supervision.  One  view  that  was  widespread  during  1991 and 
1992 was  that the  banks'  unwillingness  to lend  had  reduced  the effec- 
tiveness  of expansionary  Federal Reserve policy,  and helped  intensify  a 
credit crunch.  The reluctance  to lend was in turn blamed on excessively 
cautious  bank  supervision  and  on  the  tight  capital  requirements  im- 
posed  by the Basle rules. 
In their paper,  John Boyd and  Mark Gertler document  in a series  of 
graphs  the  trends  that  have  affected  the  banking  system  since  World 
War II.  Since  1975,  banks  have  been  providing  a  declining  share  of 
the  credit granted  by  financial  institutions.  The share of loans  in their 
portfolios  increased,  but  since  the  early  1980s,  the  share of mortgages 
in bank loans  has been  rising as the share of commercial and industrial 
(C&I) loans  has fallen.  Most strikingly,  an increasing  proportion  of C&I 
loans  has been  provided  by foreign  or offshore  banks. 
On  the  liabilities  side,  the  share  of  checkable  deposits  has  declined 
from 70% in 1952 to less  than 20% today.  Money  market liabilities and 
long-term  debt  now  each  exceed  checkable  deposits,  and  small-time 
and  savings  deposits  are the  largest  single  liability category.  Thus,  the 
textbook  picture of banks as deposit-taking  institutions  is not accurate; 
managed  liabilities  are far more  important  to  their business  than  de- 
posits. 
Bank equity  capital kept  declining  until  1974 and has since  generally 
been  rising.  With the  imposition  of the  Basle capital standards,  equity Editorial 9 
will have  to rise a bit further. Boyd and Gertler show  that equity  ratios 
decline  with  bank  size,  and  that the  ten  largest  banks  had  in  1991 an 
equity  ratio of 4.7%, well  below  the Basle-required  8%. 
Banks' rate of return on equity  fluctuated  between  11 and  15% until 
1987,  when  the  writeoffs  associated  with  the  international  debt  crisis 
drove  the average  return on equity below  2%. After a rebound  in 1988, 
bank returns were below  10% from 1989 to 1991. Boyd and Gertler show 
that this poor performance  is mainly attributable to the big banks.  They 
ask  whether  this  could  be  a result  of  the  regional  size  distribution  of 
banks,  or of differences  in their portfolio composition,  but after statisti- 
cal testing,  conclude  that it is bigness  per se that is associated  with  low 
returns. 
They argue that the "too-big-to-fail"  doctrine was  responsible  for ex- 
cessive  risk taking  by  big  banks  and  then  discuss  alternatives  to  this 
doctrine.  They  come  out  in  favor  of  narrow  banking-alternatively 
warehouse  banking-in  which  certain banks  hold  only  absolutely  safe 
assets,  such  as Treasury bills,  and  so  are never  at risk.  Depositors  in 
other banks would  be at risk, and would  be clearly told so.  Presumably 
this  way  those  depositors  who  value  safety  could  have  it,  and  those 
who  value  higher  returns  could  have  that,  at the  cost  of bearing  the 
higher risks. Boyd and Gertler also come out in favor of the Basle capital 
requirements. 
As with  the other papers,  the discussants'  comments  are well  worth 
reading: Fischer Black presents  a radical, finance-based  view  that banks 
and their failures do not matter, and Martin Feldstein criticizes the regu- 
lators and  the Basle capital requirements. 
The conference  at which  these  papers  were  presented  was  smoothly 
organized  and  run  by  Kirsten  Foss  Davis  and  Rob Shannon.  For the 
second  time,  Chad Jones  of MIT (and Stanford) has  done  the  detailed 
editing  of  the  papers  and  comments,  and  acted  as rapporteur  for the 
general  discussion.  He has  done  a superb job. 
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer 